In-office magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) equipment ownership and MRI volume among medicare patients in orthopedic practices by Robert L. Ohsfeldt et al.
RESEARCH Open Access
In-office magnetic resonance imaging (MRI)
equipment ownership and MRI volume among
medicare patients in orthopedic practices
Robert L. Ohsfeldt1* , Pengxiang Li2 and John E. Schneider3
Abstract
Background: Concerns have been raised about physician ownership of onsite advanced imaging equipment as
allowed under Stark laws by the in-office ancillary service exception (IOASE).
Methods: A web-based survey of orthopedic practices in the United States was used to assign a first date of onsite
MRI capacity acquisition (if any) to specific orthopedic practices. Medicare claims data for 2006–2010 was obtained
for providers in orthopedic practices acquiring onsite MRI capacity and in matched orthopedic practices without an
onsite MRI over the same period of time. Multivariate regression was used to estimate the change in provider
Medicare MRI volume one year before and one year after the onsite MRI acquisition year for providers in MRI
practices compared to providers in propensity-score matched non-MRI practices.
Results: In all of the MRI volume change models estimated, the association between onsite MRI acquisition and the
change in provider Medicare MRI volume (one-year post-onsite-MRI-acquisition less one year pre-acquisition) was
consistently small and not statistically significant. This lack of association was robust to changes in model
specification in terms of types of MRI exams considered, specific covariates included in the multivariate model, or
the process used to confirm individual provider affiliation with study practices in study years.
Conclusions: Our analysis of Medicare claims data provides no empirical support for the proposition that
acquisition of onsite MRI capacity within an orthopedic surgery practice induces an increase in the rate of MRI use
for Medicare patients among practice providers, relative to physicians in practices without MRI capacity over the
same time period.
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Background
Considerable concern has been expressed about the ef-
fects of physician ownership of imaging equipment on the
use of such services in the United States [1–4]. A series of
laws known as “Stark Laws” (named for the law’s primary
sponsor, United States Congressman Pete Stark) generally
prohibit physicians from referring patients covered by
Medicare (a universal public insurance program for per-
sons age 65 or older) for certain “designated health ser-
vices” if the referring physician or his/her family has a
financial relationship with the service provider. The first
of these laws (“Stark I”), effective in 1992, banned referral
of Medicare patients to provider-owned clinical laborator-
ies. Effective in 1998, “Stark II” expanded the self-referral
ban to a number of additional ancillary health services,
and extended the self-referral ban to patients covered by
Medicaid (a public insurance program for low income in-
dividuals). Finally, effective in 2007, “Stark III” provided
additional regulatory guidance for compliance, such as de-
fining specific provider compensation arrangements as
analogous to ownership interests [5, 6].
The Stark Law restrictions on physician self-referral
were intended to avoid the financial incentives for physi-
cians to increase the volume of referrals for ancillary ser-
vices, particularly with physician ownership of imaging
service capacity [7–17]. However, many factors affect
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decisions about which patients receive imaging services.
Carey and Garrett found that the use of CT and MRI
exams for low back pain patients was associated with pa-
tient characteristics, such as baseline functional status
[18]. In a randomized controlled trial of patients with
low back pain, Gilbert and colleagues found those who
received “early” imaging had better outcomes than those
receiving delayed imaging [19]. If onsite imaging ad-
vances the timing of imaging or otherwise enhances the
appropriate use of imaging in treatment, onsite imaging
may improve the quality of care. Some have questioned
whether the lower rate of referral among physicians
without ready access to imagining capacity represents
underuse rather than overuse by physicians with such
capacity [20]. Indeed, the rationale for the “In-Office
Ancillary Services Exception” (IOASE) to the Stark re-
striction relates to the potential benefits of onsite ancil-
lary service availability [5].
The incentives for physician practices to acquire onsite
imaging capacity extend beyond the indirect payment
from a referral to a physician-owned service in a fee-for-
service (FFS) payment system. The relationship between
a physician practice and ancillary services represents a
“vertical relationship,” which can be organized through
market-based contractual arrangements or through ver-
tical integration [21, 22], i.e., direct practice ownership
as permitted by IOASE. Orthopedic practices without an
onsite MRI typically refer patients to a shared MRI facil-
ity, often offered through a hospital outpatient depart-
ment (HOPD) proximate to the practice location, but
practices relying on shared facilities have less control
over the scheduling of MRI exams.
Thus, the choice of using onsite or shared MRI equip-
ment is a variant of the classic “make or buy” decision in
organizational economics, which is mainly influenced by
scope economies and transaction economies [23–29].
The make-or-buy decision has been studied extensively
in the context of transaction cost economics, which
posits that the boundaries of organizations are in large
part a function of the nature of the business transacted,
where relatively complex transactions are more effi-
ciently organized in settings that feature stronger admin-
istrative controls, such as ownership [23, 27, 29]. In the
market for medical care, consumer transaction costs are
the costs incurred to the consumer to complete a trans-
action, including the time necessary to implement in-
formed choice, such as evaluating, choosing and locating
a care provider, as well as the time spent directly obtain-
ing the services [22]. Consumer transaction costs are ex-
pected to be lower in the case of onsite MRI availability
because patients may be able to economize on identify-
ing, vetting, locating and traveling to a provider [30]. In
addition, there are several potential convenience-related
benefits associated with onsite availability, including
easier scheduling, enhanced adherence to treatment
plans [31, 32], and “one-stop shopping” [33–35]. Like-
wise, monitoring costs may be reduced via onsite MRI
capacity, to the extent it permits practices to improve
supervision of the quality of care, and allows for better
coordination among patients, physicians, and ancillary
services, and to provide incentives for patients to adhere
to recommended treatment plans [36].
Opponents of IOASE contend that the purported ben-
efits of onsite availability are non-existent or overstated
[37], instead focusing on the role of asymmetrical and
imperfect information, which may allow providers to
“induce” demand for ancillary services [8–17]. The po-
tential impact on the extent of demand inducement
resulting from physician ownership of imaging services
under FFS payment relates to the magnitude of the in-
direct payment to providers from imaging service own-
ership, which would be analogous to an equivalent
increase in the direct provider payment for professional
services [22]. The impact of this incentive is muted by
payer policy which often requires pre-authorization or
pre-certifications, thus limiting provider discretion over
the provision of imaging services [38, 39].
Those advocating an end to IOASE point to a number
of studies concluding the financial incentives from phys-
ician self-referral causes an increase in the volume of
services provided under FFS payment so large as to out-
weigh any benefits [8–17], though some suggest that
movement away from FFS payment would be a superior
solution compared to ending IOASE [40]. However,
most of these studies do not provide adequate adjust-
ment for incentives beyond self-referral for practices to
acquire onsite services, which is a likely source of bias
toward finding a positive association between MRI ac-
quisition and MRI volume.
The present study addresses this methodological limi-
tation in the existing literature by using Medicare claims
data to assess the extent of differences in MRI exams for
Medicare patients among providers in orthopedic prac-
tices before and after their practice acquired onsite MRI
capacity, compared to physicians in matched orthopedic
practices without onsite MRI over the same period of
time.
Methods
A persistent challenge in the literature on this subject is
the limited data on the extent and timing of physician
practice acquisition of imaging capacity. The present
study used a web-based survey of orthopedic practices
in the United States to determine the date of onsite MRI
capacity acquisition, or the absence of onsite MRI cap-
acity, to facilitate a comparison of MRI use with/without
onsite MRI capacity. A practice-level propensity score
(PS) matching approach was used to match orthopedic
Ohsfeldt et al. Health Economics Review  (2015) 5:31 Page 2 of 10
practices with onsite MRI to non-MRI practices. Multi-
variate regression models were used to examine the
change in Medicare MRIs per Medicare patient one year
before and one year after the onsite MRI acquisition year
for providers in MRI practices compared to providers in
non-MRI comparison practices.
Practice survey data
A survey of orthopedic practices in the United States was
initiated in July 2012 with the support of the American
Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons (AAOS) to determine
the date of first acquisition onsite MRI equipment (if any),
and general information about the practice. Details about
the administration of the AAOS practice survey have been
reported elsewhere [41].
For practices reporting onsite MRI capacity, respon-
dents were asked to report the number of practice pro-
viders (and their UPIN/NPI numbers) authorized to order
an MRI as of the year of their first onsite MRI acquisition.
All non-MRI practice respondents reported the number
of current providers in the practice authorized to order
MRI exams (and their UPIN/NPI numbers).
By September 2012, the orthopedic practice survey
was closed with a total of 770 responses received. Elim-
inating duplicate and incomplete responses yielded 740
practice responses. An additional 185 practices did not
report provider ID numbers (167 [90 %] of these re-
ported no onsite MRI capacity) and thus were excluded
from the practice sample used for PS matching of onsite
MRI and comparison non-MRI practices.
Selection of MRI and non-MRI practices
At the time of this study, the most recent full year of
Medicare claims data available was for 2010. To assure a
full year of Medicare claims data before and after MRI
acquisition, 63 practices which reported a first MRI ac-
quisition in 2007, 2008, or 2009 were classified as MRI
“case” practices. Similarly, 465 practices without an
onsite MRI by December 31, 2010, or practices which
acquired an onsite MRI after January 1, 2011, were clas-
sified as non-MRI practices.
Preliminary confirmation of the respondent-reported
physician ID numbers was obtained by using the survey-
reported physician ID numbers to the NPI/UPIN cross-
walk file to get a UPIN number (for physicians with an
NPI in the survey) or NPI number (for physicians with a
UPIN in the survey). Next, we merged the survey phys-
ician UPIN/NPI numbers with the CMS National Plan
and Provider Enumeration System (NPPES) Full Re-
placement Monthly NPI File [42] for the MRI acquisi-
tion year (for MRI practices) or 2012 (for non-MRI
practices).
Comparing the city and state of the provider’s business
mailing address from NPPES to the survey reported city
and state of practice address revealed the states did not
match for more than 50 % of the physician ID numbers for
195 of the survey practices. These 14 MRI practices and
181 non-MRI practices were excluded from the practices
considered for inclusion in the final sample of practices
(see Table 1). In addition, we excluded 172 practices not
serving Medicare beneficiaries and all providers without
valid UPIN/NPI.
For the resulting sample of 32 MRI practices and 129
non-MRI practices, we used a propensity score (PS) ap-
proach to identify specific non-MRI (comparison) prac-
tices to be matched to specific MRI (case) practices. The
PS matching approach was originally developed in part
to enhance the efficiency of sampling comparison obser-
vations to be included in the study sample over random
sampling from a large pool of potential observations
[43]. The first step in the PS matching approach is to es-
timate a model to predict the likelihood of onsite MRI
acquisition for individual practices based on various
practice characteristics – specifically practice character-
istics that might also affect the volume of MRI exams
performed by practice providers.
We used a logistic regression model predicting the
likelihood of onsite MRI acquisition which included as
predictor variables the number of providers in the prac-
tice, practice payer mix (Medicare revenue share), num-
ber of Medicare beneficiaries they served, number of
providers with valid UPIN or NPI), percentage of pro-
viders in the same city during our study years, and
dummy variables for Census region (model results not
reported). The Hosmer–Lemeshow χ2 test statistic for
the model is 21.8 (p < 0.01), with a c-statistic of 0.827
and McFadden’s R-squared of 0.30. The common sup-
port for the PS model (in terms of predicted probabil-
ities) covers the range of 0.056 to 0.921, with 76 % of
practices (123 out of 161) in this range. Only the prac-
tice size variables (number of providers in the practice,
number of Medicare beneficiaries served, and number of
Table 1 Survey practices and sample physicians
A: Number of survey practices and physicians by cohort
MRI acquisition year Number of
practices





Without MRI thru 2010 442 265 1790
2011-2013 23 19 220
Total 465 284 2010
Treatment
2007 30 21 276
2008 15 12 206
2009 18 16 283
Total 63 49 765
Sources: AAOS Survey Data, 2012; CMS NPPES Downloadable File [39]; see text
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providers with valid UPIN or NPI) were statistically sig-
nificant in the model (p < 0.01)
The logistic regression index value (i.e., Xβ) for each
practice was used as a practice-level propensity score for
onsite MRI acquisition. For PS matching of MRI to non-
MRI practices, there is a classic trade-off between the
degree to which PS matching achieves “balance” across
covariates for case and comparison practices and the
number of case practices retained in the PS-matched
sample to be used in the analysis [44]. In this case, be-
cause MRI practices are fundamentally different from
non-MRI practices in terms of a key practice character-
istic (specifically, practice size), restricting the matching
of non-MRI practices to comparable MRI practices
based on an exact or near exact PS would have resulted
in a very small sample of matched case-comparison
practices. Adding more covariates to the PS model
would not enhance the prospects for more precise PS
matches given the predominance of practice size in pre-
dicting MRI acquisition.
To address the trade-off between covariate balance
and sample size, we used PS caliper matching to avoid
selecting a non-MRI practice as a match for an MRI
practice when the practices were too dissimilar to con-
stitute a reasonable match, while retaining a reasonable
sample size. Specifically, we used one-to-one PS caliper
matching (without replacement), with the caliper
restricting the acceptable difference in PS to be less than
25 % of the standard deviation of the PS distribution
across all practices [45]. By imposing this PS caliper re-
striction, 23 MRI practices and 23 matched non-MRI
comparison practices were identified, with a total of 252
and 181 affiliated providers, respectively (Table 2).
Medicare claims data
Three years of Medicare Part B utilization data were ob-
tained for each of the 433 physicians from the three MRI
“treatment” cohorts (2007, 2008, and 2009) and the three
matched non-MRI comparison cohorts. For example, for
each of the 100 physicians in the 2007 MRI treatment
group and each of 67 physicians in the 2007 non-MRI
comparison group, we accumulated all Medicare claims
containing each individual UPIN/NPI for one year before
and one year after the MRI acquisition cohort year. Specif-
ically, we obtained all patient claims from Medicare car-
rier files for 2006, and 2008 associated with 167 physician
UPIN/NPIs. With duplicate UPIN/NPIs associated with
physicians with multiple practice locations, there were a
total of 287 physician IDs (UPIN/NPIs) in the “finder file”
(used to link providers to their claims) for calendar years
2006 and 2008 (i.e., one year before and one year after
2007), with 631,510 claims and 452,103 Medicare patient
visits in the Medicare carrier file with one of the 287
UPIN/NPIs. Among these 287 UPIN/NPIs, 182 UPIN/
NPIs had a business zip code in Medicare carrier file that
matched the practice zip code in the AAOS survey (see
Fig. 1). The sample of physicians with UPIN/NPI zip
codes that match the AAOS survey zip code are used as
the principal sample for the analysis of patterns of MRI
use in the Medicare claims data.
An analogous approach was used to aggregate Medi-
care claims data for the physicians in the 2008 and 2009
cohorts. Specifically, the pre-MRI year Medicare claims
data are for the calendar year 2007 and 2009 for the
2008 and 2009 cohorts, respectively, and the post-MRI
year Medicare claims data are for the calendar year 2009
and 2010 respectively.
Despite our efforts to use all available CMS data to
confirm the practice affiliation of providers obtained
from the AAOS practice survey data, the possibility of
errors in the assignment of specific providers to specific
practices at the time of first onsite MRI acquisition re-
mains. To assess the extent of any assignment errors, all
46 practices included in the final sample of matched
onsite MRI and non-MRI practices were re-surveyed.
The MRI practices were asked to confirm that the prac-
tice acquired its first onsite MRI in the indicated MRI
year (e.g., 2008 for MRI practices in the 2008 cohort),
and non-MRI practices were asked to confirm that the
practice did not have onsite MRI capacity in any of the
study years for that practice (e.g., 2007–2009 for a non-
MRI practice in the 2008 cohort). The re-survey instru-
ment also provided a list of UPIN/NPI numbers specific
to each of the 46 practices (obtained from the initial sur-
vey). Practices were asked to confirm whether the listed
providers were affiliated with the practice during all of
the specific study years for that practice (e.g., 2007–2009
for a practice with MRI year 2008, or a non-MRI prac-
tice matched to a 2008 MRI practice).
A total of 20 of the 46 practices responded to the re-
survey (46 % response rate). All of the responding prac-
tices confirmed that the MRI or non-MRI status in the
survey was correct. The respondents also confirmed that
about 90 % of the provider ID numbers from the original
survey were affiliated with the practice in both the pre-
and post-MRI year for the practice. While the results of
Table 2 Survey practices and sample physicians
B: Number of physicians and practices among treatment and control
group
Number of practices Number of physicians
Comparison Treatment Total Comparison Treatment Total
2007 11 11 22 67 100 167
2008 4 4 8 17 35 52
2009 8 8 16 97 117 214
Total 23 23 46 181 252 433
Sources: AAOS Survey Data, 2012; CMS NPPES Downloadable File [39]; see text
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the re-survey suggest that provider timing assignment
errors in the principal provider sample were not com-
mon, all regression models using the principal provider
sample were re-estimated using a restricted sample of
providers with a confirmed practice affiliation for the
pre- and post-MRI years.
Analytic approach
The unit of analysis for the Medicare claims data ana-
lysis is the individual physicians affiliated with the MRI
treatment practices and the matched non-MRI compari-
son practices. The analysis focuses on the difference in
the volume of MRI exams ordered by each physician
during the calendar year after the year of onsite MRI ac-
quisition and the volume of MRI exams ordered by the
same physician during the calendar year before MRI ac-
quisition. The intent is to assess the “steady state” vol-
ume of MRI exams with and without onsite MRI, as the
volume of MRI exams immediately after the acquisition
of onsite MRI capacity may be atypical if practices work
off “pent up” demand for MRI exams when the onsite
MRI capacity first becomes available.
The analytic approach makes use of a multivariate re-
gression model of the general form
ΔMRIi;j;r ¼ MRIi;j;r;tþ1−MRIi;j;r;t−1
 
¼ α þ β Onsitej;r;t þ ϕ Practicej;r;t
þ ψ Arear;t þ i;j;r ð1Þ
In Eq. (1), the term “ΔMRIi,j,r” indicates the difference
in the volume of MRI exams in the Medicare claims data
for an individual physician (i) in a specific practice (j) lo-
cated in a specific county (r) for one year post-onsite-
MRI acquisition (t + 1) and one year pre-onsite-MRI ac-
quisition (t-1). For physicians in the matched non-MRI
comparison practices, the MRI acquisition year for the
matched MRI practice (t) is used as a pseudo-MRI year
to define the pre- and post-MRI-year volume of MRI
exams. The term “Onsitej,r,t” is a binary variable equal to
one for physicians in practices acquiring onsite MRI
capacity in year t and zero for physicians in the matched
non-MRI practices.
The modeling approach is a variant of the familiar
“differences in differences” approach [46]. By focusing
on the change in the volume of MRI exams for individ-
ual physicians, each physician acts as his or her own
“control,” in that any specific characteristics of the indi-
vidual physician (e.g., practice style, patient case mix)
that might influence the physician’s use of MRI exams
but remain essentially constant over the 3 year pre/post
period will “difference out” when examining the change
in the volume (post-pre) onsite MRI acquisition. Thus,
the dependent variable is only affected by factors that
vary over time. Beyond the change in onsite MRI status,
general market conditions for orthopedic services could
have changed over the pre- and post-MRI periods. Thus,
a multivariate model is estimated that also adjusts for
differences between MRI and non-MRI practices in
practice characteristics (“Practicej,r,t”) and county-level
practice area characteristics (“Arear,t”) that remain after
PS matching. Finally, α, β, ϕ, and ψ in Eq. (1) represent
parameters to be estimated by the regression model, and
represents an error term. The estimation procedure
used accounts for the likely correlation in errors among
physicians in the same practices.
As noted, a PS matching procedure was used to provide
a rationale for the selection of the MRI and comparison
non-MRI practices to be used to collect Medicare claims
data for the providers in the selected MRI and non-MRI
practices. If PS matching had achieved an exact or near
exact match between case and comparison practices, differ-
ences in observed practice characteristics between the
physicians in the treatment and comparison groups might
have been negligible, making covariate adjustment for
practice characteristics in a multivariate regression un-
necessary. However, PS matching of MRI practices to non-
MRI practices is approximate in this application. Coupled
with the fact that the level of analysis is the individual pro-
viders in the matched practices, some significant differ-
ences between the practice characteristics of the physicians
in the MRI practices and physicians in matched non-MRI
Fig. 1 Flow Chart of Sample Selection for 2007 Cohort
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practices remain, as shown in Table 3. Physicians in MRI-
acquiring practices had higher Medicare MRI volume than
physicians in non-MRI practices both one year before and
one year after the MRI acquisition year. The MRI-
acquiring practices were larger (in terms of number of pro-
viders) and were located in areas experiencing growth in
per capita income, compared to non-MRI practices. Given
these differences, some covariate adjustment in a multivari-
ate regression model may be needed [47]. Thus, we esti-
mate alternative specifications of Eq. (1) with and without
different categories of covariates included in the model.
The primary measure of “ΔMRIi,j,r” is the difference in
the total number of Medicare MRI exams (post-pre) or-
dered by each physician as a percentage of all Medicare
outpatient visits for each physician. (See Table 3 for spe-
cific HCPCS codes defining MRI exams.). An alternative
measure focuses on the post/pre difference in MRI
exams with diagnosis codes indicative of orthopedic con-
ditions (“Ortho-MRI”) as a percentage of all Medicare
outpatient visits for each physician (see Table 3). We
also analyze the post-pre difference in the absolute
(total) number of Medicare MRI exams and Medicare
orthopedic-MRI exams for each physician.
All multivariate regression models were estimated
using Stata Version 13 (http://www.stata.com/stata13/),
employing the “cluster” option (to account for physicians
in the sample affiliated with the same practice) and the
“robust” standard error option (to account for other po-
tential departures from homoscedasticity by using the
Huber-White robust standard error estimator).
Results
Table 4 provides model estimates of the effect of onsite
MRI acquisition (“Onsite MRI”) on the change in total
Medicare MRI exams as a percentage of total Medicare
outpatient visits for specific physicians over the post/pre
MRI year period. Column 1 of Table 4 reports the esti-
mated impact onsite MRI capacity acquisition on the
change in Medicare MRI volume as a percentage of
Medicare visits in a regression model with no covariate
adjustment (other than MRI cohort year). The model spe-
cification in column 2 adds measures of practice size as
covariate adjusters, column 3 also includes practice payer
mix variables, and column 4 adds the post-pre change in
levels of county-level practice area characteristics.
The point estimate for the coefficient of the onsite
MRI variable in each of these alternative regression
model specifications is negative, which suggests the
change in Medicare MRI volume for providers in MRI
practices was lower than the change for non-MRI prac-
tices over the same time period, but all of the estimated
coefficients are small in magnitude and not statistically
significant (p > 0.05).
Focusing briefly on estimated coefficient values for
other covariates included in the model reported in col-
umn 4, the estimated coefficients of the MRI cohort year
variables suggest that the change in MRI volume for
providers in the 2008 cohort was 2.2 percentage points
greater than the change for providers in the reference-
category 2007 cohort (p = 0.038), adjusting for other var-
iables included in the model. A 1 percentage point
greater Medicare share in the practice payer mix was as-
sociated with a 0.09 percentage point greater change in
provider Medicare MRI volume (p = 0.010), and a 1 per-
centage point greater private insurance share in the
Table 3 Sample means for physician practice sample, by on-site
MRI status
All MRI No MRI
[n = 433] [n = 252] [n = 181]
MRI Volumea (% Medicare Visits)
Pre-MRI year 1.151 1.460 0.595
Post-MRI year 1.312 1.530 0.919
Δ(Post-Pre) 0.161 0.071 0.324
Ortho-MRI Volumeb (% Medicare Visits)
Pre-MRI year 1.066 1.391 0.482
Post-MRI year 1.239 1.478 0.809
Δ(Post-Pre) 0.173 0.087 0.327
MRI Year (%)
2006 38.55 44.72 27.43
2007 26.54 31.21 18.14
2008 34.91 24.08 54.42
Number of providers (%)
1-2 2.37 1.47 3.98
3-5 6.64 5.90 7.96
6-10 26.86 12.53 52.65
>10 64.14 80.10 35.40
Practice Payer Mix (%)
Medicare 27.07 26.13 28.77
Private Insurance 46.90 47.83 45.22
Workers’ Comp 12.30 12.10 12.64
Other 13.74 13.94 13.38
Area Characteristics (Post-Pre)
ΔPer capita income ($1000s) 1.211 1.916 −0.058
ΔPop age 65+ (%) 0.449 0.467 0.417
ΔUnemployment (%) 2.860 2.461 3.578
ΔMDs/1000 Population −0.0018 −0.0045 0.0032
Sources: Medicare Claims Data; AAOS Survey Data, 2012; Area Resource File
(see text)
aHCPCS codes 71552, 73218, 73718, 74183, 77059, 70543, 70551, 70553,
72141, 72146, 72148, 72156, 72157, 72158, 72195, 72197, 73220, 73221, 73222,
73223, 73720, 73721, 73722, 73723, 70336, 70540, 70542, 70552, 71550, 71551,
72142, 72147, 72149, 72196, 73219, 73719, 74181, 74182, or 77084
bHCPCS codes 72141, 72146, 72148, 72156, 72157, 72158, 72195, 72197,
73220, 73221, 73222, 73223, 73720, 73721, 73722, or 73723
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practice payer mix was associated with a 0.06 percentage
point greater change in provider Medicare MRI volume
(p = 0.006). None of the remaining estimated coefficients
were statistically significant at the p < 0.05 level.
To assess whether the finding of a lack of association
between onsite MRI acquisition and changes in the
volume of Medicare MRI exams is robust to model spe-
cification changes, models were estimated using four al-
ternative measures of the change in provider MRI exam
volume: 1) the change in MRI exams as a percentage of
all Medicare patient visits; 2) the change in orthopedic-
related MRI exams as a percentage of all Medicare
patient visits; 3) the absolute change in the number of
MRI exams; and 4) the absolute change in the number
of orthopedic-related MRI exams.
We also estimated models using the principal study
sample and an alternative subsample of providers con-
firmed by the AAOS practice re-survey to have been prac-
ticing in the study practices during both study years. Point
estimates of the coefficient of the onsite MRI variable and
their associated p-values (for a two-tailed test of the null
hypothesis that the true coefficient equals zero) across
these alternative model specifications are summarized in
Table 5. [Full model results are available on request].
Table 4 Estimated difference in percent medicare visits for MRI exams for physicians Post/Pre Onsite MRI acquisition relative to
physicians without onsite MRI, 2007–2009 cohorts
ΔMRIs as % Visits Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Coeffi-cient p-value Coeffi-cient p-value Coeffi-cient p-value Coeffi-cient p-value
Onsite MRI −0.330 0.486 −0.139 0.753 −0.237 0.507 −0.468 0.161
MRI Year
2007 Reference – Reference – Reference – Reference –
2008 1.569 0.063 1.570 0.068 0.817 0.125 2.175 0.038
2009 0.424 0.454 0.567 0.323 0.227 0.533 1.157 0.067
Number of providers
1-2 – – Reference – Reference – Reference –
3-5 – – −1.930 0.088 −1.121 0.398 −1.086 0.448
6-10 – – −2.199 0.037 −2.142 0.076 −1.892 0.095
>10 – – −2.395 0.023 −2.015 0.072 −1.907 0.083
Practice Payer Mix (%)
Medicare – – – – 0.0734 0.006 0.0926 0.010
Private Insurance – – – – 0.0660 0.004 0.0644 0.006
Workers’ Comp – – – – 0.0289 0.511 0.0442 0.353
Other – – – – Reference – Reference –
Area Characteristics
ΔPer cap inc ($1000s) – – – – – – 0.072 0.278
ΔPop age 65+ (%) – – – – – – 0.516 0.198
ΔUnemployment (%) – – – – – – −0.246 0.216
ΔMDs/1000 Pop – – – – – – −1.215 0.418
F-Statistic (p-value) 1.37 0.266 1.81 0.125 2.80 0.013 2.93 0.007
Sources: see text
Table 5 Summary of estimated coefficient for “Onsite MRI” for alternative measures of the difference in medicare MRI volume and
alternative provider samples
MRI volume change measure Principal provider sample (N = 433) Confirmed provider sample (N = 371)
“Onsite MRI” p-value “Onsite MRI” p-value
ΔMRIs as % Visits −0.468 0.161 −0.604 0.273
ΔOrtho MRIs as % Visits −0.399 0.210 −0.787 0.128
ΔNumber of MRIs 2.165 0.420 1.591 0.310
ΔNumber of Ortho MRIs 0.102 0.977 0.152 0.507
Sources: see tex
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None of the point estimates of the onsite MRI coeffi-
cient are statistically significant (p > 0.1) across all of alter-
native model specifications reported in Table 5. Results
using the principal provider sample are similar (in terms
of coefficient point estimates) to results using a sample re-
stricted to providers with their practice location during
the study years confirmed by the practice re-survey. Thus,
any potential errors in the assignment of specific physi-
cians to specific practices appear to be too infrequent to
have a substantive impact on model results.
Discussion
Economic theory predicts, and our results confirm, prac-
tices using imaging more intensively were more likely to
acquire onsite MRI capacity (i.e., acquiring practices had
higher MRI volume than non-MRI practices before MRI
acquisition). This creates a sample selection (or endo-
geneity) issue when attempting to assess the causal
impact of onsite MRI acquisition on MRI volume. By
using a differences-in-differences model focusing on the
change in MRI volume for individual physicians, any in-
dividual physician or practice characteristics (observed
or unobserved) potentially affecting MRI volume that
are invariant over the pre- and post- time periods
“difference out” when analyzing the change in MRI vol-
ume. Covariate adjustment using proxy measures of
physician “practice style” is not needed. Our model also
adjusts for changes in observable practice area character-
istics over time. To the extent unobservable time-
varying factors exist, such factors are likely to affect the
demand for imaging services and the likelihood of onsite
MRI acquisition in the same direction. Thus, any
remaining bias in our analysis relating to the sample se-
lection issue would be toward finding a positive associ-
ation between MRI acquisition and MRI volume.
None of our model results suggest any substantive
change in Medicare MRI volume one-year post- onsite-
MRI-acquisition and one-year pre-onsite-MRI-acquisi-
tion for physicians in MRI-acquiring practices relative to
physicians in the non-MRI comparison practices. This
finding is inconsistent with results reported in much of
the literature focused on the issue of “self-referral” for
imaging services.
The differences in findings may relate to differences in
research designs, particularly as they relate to sample se-
lection issue, and the specific measures of MRI acquisi-
tion used across studies. Some existing studies rely on
proxy measures of the existence or size of ownership in-
terests in specific ancillary services for individual physi-
cians due to a lack data for specific provider interests.
For example, close to a dozen published studies (e.g.,
Hughes et al. [12], Mitchell [13]) use an individual physi-
cian’s referral patterns to “impute” physician ownership
status for individual physicians. Specifically, physicians
with a relatively high share of their overall referrals go-
ing to a physician-owned facility are simply assumed to
have ownership interest in the facility. These studies
provide little or no evaluation of the validity of this im-
putation process for identifying individual physician
ownership status, but even if approximately valid, the
use of an imputed ownership status indicator based on
patterns of referrals to predict patterns of referrals pre-
sents what should be a rather obvious and substantial
threat to the validity of any resulting inferences about
the causal effect of ownership status on referral volume.
In contrast, our analysis uses direct and verified mea-
sures of access to onsite MRI capacity for individual
providers.
A simple cross-sectional design is used in close to a
dozen published studies, including Hillman et al. [10]
and Paxton et al. [16]. These studies compare imaging
volume for physicians with and without ownership inter-
est in imaging capacity, not before and after the acquisi-
tion of ownership interest. Our results indicate that the
physicians in practices acquiring onsite MRI capacity
had higher MRI volume before MRI acquisition than
physicians in similar practices that did not subsequently
acquire onsite MRI capacity. Thus, simple cross-sectional
comparisons are likely to yield a spurious positive as-
sociation between onsite MRI acquisition and MRI
volume owing to the endogeneity of onsite MRI cap-
acity acquisition.
Still other past studies, such as Sharpe et al. [17], focus
on imaging volume within practices acquiring imaging
capacity over time, without an appropriate contempor-
aneous comparison group. Our results indicate that MRI
volume increased over time for both MRI and non-MRI
practices. Without an appropriate comparison group,
our results might have suggested (incorrectly) that MRI
acquisition per se was associated with an increase in
MRI volume.
Finally, much of the early literature examining physician
self-referral for imaging services focused on the general
issue of physician investment interests in imaging facilities,
including free-standing (off-site) imaging centers. As
noted, organizational economics theory suggests that there
are likely to be advantages (in terms of lower monitoring
and transactions costs) associated with the ownership of
imaging capacity for providers making more extensive use
of imaging in their practices, compared to less imaging-
intensive providers. However, these advantages are likely
to more substantive for onsite capacity compared to off-
site capacity. In other words, the degree of organizational
control may be somewhat greater for owned off-site cap-
acity compared to non-owned offsite capacity, but the de-
gree of organizational control is likely to be far greater for
owned onsite capacity compared to owned off-site cap-
acity. Thus, the process of physician self-selection into
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ownership of onsite imaging capacity reflected in our data
may be different than the process of self-selection into im-
aging capacity ownership overall present in older studies.
Limitations
Although we used a web-based survey of orthopedic sur-
gery practices to identify specific providers affiliated with
practices at the time the practice first acquired onsite MRI
capacity, and then used the CMS National Plan and Pro-
vider Enumeration System (NPPES) Full Replacement
Monthly NPI File data and a re-survey of the final sample
of practices included in the analysis to confirm that physi-
cians identified as affiliated with an MRI practice in the
survey data actually were affiliated with the practice one
year before and one year the practice’s MRI-year, the po-
tential for errors in assignment of specific physicians to
specific practices remains. If these assignment errors are
common, the results of the claims data analysis of the
change in MRI volume would be biased toward a finding
of “no effect” of onsite MRI capacity.
While the practice re-survey confirmed 90 % of pro-
vider practice affiliations, the re-survey response rate
was 43 %, so a similar rate of confirmation might not
have been obtained from practices not responding to the
re-survey. However, the fact that model results restricted
to a sample of providers with confirmed practice affilia-
tions produced results similar to results using the full
(principal) provider sample provides some assurance
that the potential for provider assignment errors is not a
substantial limitation of the study.
The sample of providers included in the study was de-
rived from a PS matching approach applied at the prac-
tice level using a specific caliper intended to provide a
reasonable trade-off between covariate balance and the
number of MRI practices retained in the final sample.
Selection of a smaller caliper would have produced fewer
matches, and thus fewer providers in our analysis sam-
ple, whereas a larger caliper would have produced more
matches, and thus a larger provider sample. It is possible
that a different practice-level PS matching approach
yielding a different sample of providers in MRI and non-
MRI practices would have produced different results.
However, the fact that model results using the full
(principal) provider sample were similar to model results
using a sample of providers with re-survey confirmed
practice affiliations suggests that the results are not
highly sensitive to sampling approach used to select the
specific providers included in the analysis.
Obviously, our analysis of Medicare claims data only
provides information about patterns of MRI use within
the Medicare segment of each physician’s patient popula-
tion. No inference about whether onsite MRI acquisition
affects patterns of MRI use for other payers is possible.
Past studies have shown that geographic variation in the
use of specific services for Medicare patients is not always
reflective of patterns of use in non-Medicare populations
[48]. Orthopedic surgery practices on average derive about
one-third of their total practice revenues from Medicare.
While this is not an inconsequential share, this study can-
not assess the impact of onsite MRI capacity on use pat-
terns for about two-thirds of the typical orthopedic
surgery practice population. Even so, an assessment of the
impact of onsite MRI capacity on use patterns for Medi-
care patients has direct relevance for public policy, as the
Stark laws only apply to Medicare and Medicaid patients.
Moreover, commercial payers, especially managed care
plans, typically employ stricter MRI utilization controls
and incentives than the Medicare program [49]. Thus,
rather than a limitation, our choice of examining the
Medicare population could alternatively be viewed as a
conservative decision; if provider ownership in onsite
imaging capacity has a causal impact on imaging vol-
ume, we would expect the magnitude of the effect to be
larger in the comparatively “less managed” Medicare
population relative to more active care management in
managed care markets. Our null finding for the Medi-
care population suggests the likelihood of a null finding
in managed care population
Conclusion
Our analysis of Medicare claims data employed outpatient
claims data for the 2007, 2008, and 2009 cohorts of physi-
cians in practices which acquired onsite MRI capacity and
physicians in matched non-MRI practice. The claims
analysis focused on the change in Medicare MRI volume
one-year post-onsite-MRI-acquisition and one-year pre-
onsite-MRI-acquisition for physicians in MRI practices
relative to physicians in the non-MRI comparison prac-
tices. In all of the Medicare MRI volume change models
estimated, the estimated impact of onsite MRI acquisition
on the change in Medicare MRI volume is consistently
small and not statistically significant. Thus, our data ana-
lysis provides no empirical support for the proposition
that acquisition of onsite MRI capacity within an ortho-
pedic surgery practice induces an increase in the rate of
MRI use for Medicare patients among practice providers,
relative to physicians in practices without MRI capacity
over the same time period.
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